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Securing a Right to View: Broadening
the Scope of Negative Easements
I. Introduction
A property owner asking $925,000 for a home with a view
on Long Island Sound successfully commanded an additional
$25,000 for the view on a clear day.1 A lessee of space in the
Empire State Building claimed a substantial loss in the value
of his premises when a neighboring landowner constructed an
antenna and blocked his panoramic view of the city.2 The
owner of an apartment building on Russian Hill in San Fran-
cisco suffered a $54,000 diminution in fair market value when
an adjacent landowner added an addition and thereby ob-
structed the plaintiff's second story view.3 Homes in the San
Francisco Bay area, Palos Verdes, Monterey, and Newport
Beach, California, command amongst the highest prices for
single family residences in the United States due in large part
to their scenic views of the bay and coastline. A home in
Lake County, Illinois boasts of its "wonderful water views. '
And residents of some of the more affluent communities in
New Jersey pay enormous amounts for a view of the Manhat-
tan skyline.' Throughout the United States views represent
valuable property interests, and landowners and tenants rec-
ognize this by paying more to acquire them. Yet, in spite of
1. Kilborn, New York Home Prices Surge, N. Y. Times, June 3, 1985, at D3,
col. 2.
2. Harte v. Empire State Building Corp., 30 Misc. 2d 665, 219 N.Y.S.2d 391
(1961).
3. Wolford v. Thomas, 190 Cal. App. 3d 347, 235 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1987).
4. See R. BOYER, PLACES RATED ALMANAC 62 (1981); See also Adams, Land-use
Ruling May be Threat to Tough Zoning Regulations, San Francisco Sunday Exam-
iner and Chronicle, June 14, 1987, at B8, col. 1. See also Unique Homes 103-136
(Feb./Mar. 1989).
5. Unique Homes 254 (Feb./Mar. 1989).
6. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1989, at R50-R51.
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their value in terms of dollars at the closing table, property
views are not considered a right incident to the land in this
country and unless acquired pursuant to an express grant or
covenant, they generally aren't protected in a court of law.7
This Comment discusses the evolution of property view
rights in the United States. It necessarily makes frequent ref-
erences to the rules governing light and air because of the
similarities between light, air, and view, both in characteris-
tics and in historical treatment. Part II of this Comment de-
fines view as a negative easement and gives background his-
tory as to English and American common-law classification of
view as such. Part III gives the current state of the law with
respect to treatment of view in this country and the common
exceptions to the general rule. Part IV discusses the part local
governments play in protecting landowners from view obstruc-
tions through the use of zoning laws and ordinances. Part V
discusses the role of nuisance law as a means of further pro-
tecting landowners' view interests. Part VI considers recent
developments in the land use area and their impact on rights
to view. Part VII suggests that a solution to the problem of
securing a right to view may be found in the enactment of
nuisance legislation. This Comment concludes that the Ameri-
can judiciary's reluctance to protect property view interests
stems from its reluctance to inhibit growth and recommends
that states enact legislation which would balance society's eco-
nomic interests in growth with its increasing interest in aes-
thetics and view preservation.
II. Background
A. Classification of View as a Negative Easement
View is a negative easement. Generally defined, ease-
ments constitute property interests in land in the possession
of another8 which create a limited "use or enjoyment of the
land in which the interest exists,"" and which can be pro-
7. See infra text accompanying note 82.
8. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
9. Id. § 450(a).
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tected from interference by third parties.10 An easement does
not terminate at the will of the possessor of the land," and it
does not constitute a "normal incident of a possessory land
interest." 1
One can classify easements in a variety of ways.' 3 The
more common classifications include easements in gross and
easements appurtenant, affirmative easements and negative
easements." Easements in gross benefit their holders indepen-
dently of any ownership or possession of land.1 5 An example
of an easement in gross would be an easement held by a util-
ity company" enabling it to come onto a landowner's property
to take a gas meter reading. Appurtenant easements, on the
other hand, benefit their holders in connection with their use
of a specific parcel of land. 7 An example of an appurtenant
easement would therefore include an adjacent landowner's
right to use a neighbor's driveway" to get to his house. Thus,
while an easement in gross has no bearing on the easement
holder's use of his property, the appurtenant easement di-
rectly benefits the easement holder in the use of his land."
Though affirmative and negative easements constitute
two types of appurtenant easements, 0 they differ significantly
from one another." Affirmative easements allow the holder of
the easement to engage in affirmative acts on the servient es-
tate, acts in which he would not otherwise be privileged to
engage22 Thus, an affirmative easement might enable its
owner to cross over a part of his neighbor's property to reach
10. Id. § 450(b).
11. Id. § 450(c).
12. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 405 (1987).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §
8.2, at 440 (1984) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM].
17. Id.
18. Id. at 440-41.
19. Id. at 441.
20. See W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 23, at 64 (3d ed. 1965).
21. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 12, § 405.
22. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, § 451.
1988]
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a road abutting the neighbors land, without subjecting the
easement holder to liability for trespass.23
Negative easements, like affirmative easements, entitle
the owner thereof to make use of the land burdened by the
easement.2" However, rather than allowing the owner of such
an easement to do acts on the burdened parcel which he
would not otherwise be entitled to do, negative easements give
the easement holder the right to prevent the owner subject to
the easement from engaging in otherwise permissible acts on
his own property.25 A landowner's property view interest, in
this country, is classified as a negative easement because it
allows the owner of the easement to prevent the owners sub-
ject to the easement from engaging in any act which might
impede the easement holder's view over his neighbor's prop-
erty. 6 Other examples of negative easements, include light,
air, and lateral support.27 A negative easement for light and
air could prevent the owner of the servient tenement from er-
ecting any structure that might interfere with the dominant
tenement's easement right to the free flow of light and air
onto his property.2" Similarly, a negative easement for lateral
support might deprive the owner of the servient estate of the
right to excavate his land in such a way as would interfere
with the dominant tenement's enjoyment of such an
easement.29
Generally speaking, easements can be created by express
conveyance, by implication, or by prescription." Creation of
an easement by express conveyance usually comes in the form
of a deed, and employs language either granting the easement
to the transferee or reserving31 an easement in the trans-
23. See Id.
24. Id. § 452.
25. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 12, § 405.
26. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, § 452.
27. Id.
28. Id. comment a.
29. Id. comment b.
30. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 12, § 407.
31. An easement by reservation arises when a landowner in possession of two
adjoining parcels attempts to convey away one plot of land and retain the other with-
out foregoing any beneficial use he may have exercised over the servient parcel prior
[Vol. 6
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feror.32 Creation of an easement in the grantor by reservation
was originally rejected in the United States on the theory that
one cannot have an easement in land which one owns exclu-
sively.3 3 Courts now get around this problem by explaining
easements created by reservation in terms of "quasi-ease-
ments."8 ' The idea behind the quasi-easement theory is that
although the conveyor owned the property before the convey-
ance, he nonetheless used one part of the property to benefit
some other part, and the use resulted in a "quasi-easement"
which the conveyor should be entitled to reserve upon
conveyance.35
Easements may also be created by implication. Implied
easements, like easements by express grant or reservation,
arise in the context of the conveyance of land.36 Where ease-
ments by express grant or reservation grow out of the lan-
guage of the conveyance, easements by implication grow out
of the circumstances surrounding the conveyance 37 and there-
fore represent the court's inference of the intention of the
parties to that conveyance.3 8 Factors frequently considered in
determining whether an easement has arisen by implication
include "the extent of the necessity of the easement to the
claimant," 39 "the manner in which the land was used prior to
its conveyance,' 0 and the extent to which prior use was
known to the parties. 1 Thus, in the situation where A, the
owner of two adjacent parcels of land, conveys away one par-
cel, which is completely landlocked, and retains for himself a
second parcel, which abuts a highway, the courts will imply an
easement of necessity from the first parcel over the second
even though no express language provided for such an
to the conveyance. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 16, § 8.3, at 443.
32. R. POWELL & P. ROHEN, supra note 12, § 407.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 16, § 8.4, at 444.
37. Id.
38. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, § 476 comment a.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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easement.
Finally, easements can arise by prescription.42 Broadly
defined, prescription is "the effect of lapse of time in creating
or extinguishing [a] property interest."' s The early English
doctrine of prescription, as enacted by statute in 1189, re-
quired that the enjoyment of property be "from time imme-
morial"' in order to create or extinguish a property interest.45
A modification of this view of prescriptive easements arose
during the middle ages'6 such that prescriptive easements
came to be rationalized on the theory that a use which had
existed for a long enough period of time probably originated
by the grant of an easement since lost.41 Today, most com-
mentators parallel prescriptive easements to ownership of a
possessory estate obtained by adverse possession."8 Thus,
much like interests obtained by adverse possession, prescrip-
tive easements result from the adverse continuous and unin-
terrupted use of certain land for a designated period of time.49
Use of land qualifies as adverse to the owner of some interest
in land when it is hostile, wrongful as to the owner of the ser-
vient tenement, open and notorious.50 The period for such a
prescriptive acquisition is set by statute.5
Affirmative easements can arise by prescription in this
country.2 Such an easement might result, for instance, from
42. Id. § 457.
43. Id. § 457, Introductory Note.
44. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 12, § 413 n.3.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See W. BURBY, supra note 20, § 31, at 86. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY, supra note 8, § 457, Introductory Note. Adverse possession is a method by
which one can acquire title to real property through possession for a statutorily desig-
nated period of time. To establish title in this manner the person claiming title by
adverse possession must prove actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and adverse use for
the time period required by state law. The primary difference between adverse pos-
session and prescription is that adverse possession results in title to real property
whereas prescription results in an easement right in real property. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 49 (5th ed. 1979).
49. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, § 458.
50. Id.
51. See W. BuRBY, supra note 20, § 31, at 77.
52. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 12, § 413.
[Vol. 6
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A's persistent, hostile, traversing of B's property to get to a
nearby road.53 Like their affirmative counterparts, negative
easements may arise by express grant or covenant or by impli-
cation."' Negative easements cannot, however, arise by pre-
scription because they do not involve the necessary wrongful
activity carried out by the alleged dominant tenement against
the servient tenement. 55 Therefore, even if landowner A has
looked out over B's land for in excess of thirty years and now
seeks to enjoin him from building in order to preserve her
claimed easement of view, she will not succeed since the mere
act of looking out over B's property did not constitute a
wrongful act against B.5 1 Stated differently, B cannot lose his
right to build simply because he did not exercise that right in
the past.
B. Historical Evolution of the Easements of Light, Air and
View
Under early common law, access to light and air was
looked upon as a natural right, "incident to the ownership of
land. ' 57 Natural rights differed from easements in that natu-
ral rights inhered by law and thus came into existence by vir-
tue of land possession alone, while easements could not arise
unless specifically created, 58 regardless of their affirmative or
negative character. Support for this view of light and air as
natural rights came primarily from an English case heard in
1444 during the reign of Henry VI.59 The court noted in its
opinion that "if a man builds a house and stops up the light
coming to my house, or causes the rain to fall from his house
53. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, § 458(b) comment g, illustra-
tion 7.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
55. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, § 458(b) comment e.
56. See id.
57. Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REV. 94,
108 (1977).
58. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 16, § 8.1, at 439; See also RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY, supra note 8, § 450(c) comment i.
59. See Comment, supra note 57, at 108. The English Case is cited as Y.B. Mich.
22 Hen. 6, fo. 14, pl. 23 (1444). Comment, supra note 57, at 108 n.54.
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and so undermines my house, or does anything which injures
my free tenement, I shall have the assize of nuisance."' By
the end of the sixteenth century, English courts" no longer
classified light and air as natural rights but as negative ease-
ments.2 Though the courts made little mention of the right to
view during this period, it appears that view may also have
constituted a natural right up until the time of Aldred's
Case6 in 1611, when the court expressly held that an action in
nuisance would not lie for the stopping of prospect.6 4
During this same period, the English judiciary created the
Doctrine of Ancient Lights. This Doctrine, based on prescrip-
tion,6" provides that the owner of two adjoining lots who has
enjoyed a continuous right to the free flow of light and air
from the second lot to the first, and who subsequently conveys
away the second parcel, retains his right to the unobstructed
flow of light and air onto his property, provided he has en-
joyed this right for a period of twenty years.6 The courts re-
60. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 166 (5th ed. and Impression
1975) (translating from the original).
61. See Bowery & Popes Case 1, Leo. 168, 74 Eng. Rep. 155 (K.B. 1589) (Here,
the court confers upon the landowner the right to prevent his neighbor from ob-
structing his light. "If it were an antient [sic] window time out of memory ,etc., where
the light or benefit of it ought not to be impaired by any act whatsoever; and such
was the opinion of the whole court"). Id.
See also supra note 57, at 109.
62. Comment, supra note 57, at 109.
63. 9 Co. Rep. at fo. 57b (1611).
64. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 60, at 332.
Much of the confusion as to what rights under common law constituted easements
and what rights constituted natural rights stemmed from the English courts' lack of
clarity in distinguishing between the two. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 60, at 156.
The fact that the "assize of nuisance served as the remedy for both the infringement
of natural rights and of easements" furthered the confusion as to the nature of these
rights. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 60, at 329. The term "prospect", commonly
used in early case holdings has the same meaning as the modern term "view" and the
two terms may be used interchangeably. View is "the common-law right of prospect."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (5th ed. 1979).
65. Nomar v Ballard, 60 S.E.2d 710, 714 (W. Va. 1950); See supra text accompa-
nying notes 42-56 for a discussion of prescription.
66. For a discussion on the Doctrine of Ancient Light see 1A G. THOMPSON,
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 238 (1980). Because the Doctrine of Ancient Lights
derivates from the English law of Prescription, it is commonly referred to by Ameri-
can courts as "the prescriptive doctrine" or "prescription." 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss1/7
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jected such a prescriptive right to view, however, because they
looked upon view as a "matter only of delight" 67 as distin-
guished from light and air which they classified as
necessities.68
By the time of the American Revolution, the English ju-
diciary recognized negative easements for light, air,' and
view70 but differed in their approach as to the creation of the
respective easements. Consequently, rights to light and air
could arise by grant or covenant,72 implication 73 or prescrip-
tion74 while rights to view could only arise by express grant or
covenant.7
Early American courts initially adopted the English clas-
sification of light, air, and view as negative easements. 6 They
also perpetuated the English variation in the treatment of the
easements of light and air, and of easements of view, by
adopting the common-law doctrine of Ancient Lights and by
adhering to the common-law practice of granting easements of
light and air by implication. Since both the prescriptive Doc-
note 60, at 166.
67. William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. at fo. 57 b.
68. Id.
69. Comment, supra note 57, at 108; See also J. DUKEMINIER. PROPERTY 1002
(1981) (where the author acknowledges that at early common law the English courts
recognized such negative easements as light, air, and support).
70. See C.J. GALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EAsaMErrS 304-05 (9th ed. 1916).
The author acknowleges that such a right to view may be created by express grant or
covenant and that "the enforcement by a court of a covenant not to build so as to
obstruct a view has been described as an extension in equity of the doctrine of nega-
tive easements." Id. at 305.
71. See A. REEVES, A TREATISE ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, §
205 (1904). The idea was that light and air, on the one hand, differed from view, on
the other, because light and air constituted something which was perceived as being
necessary while view merely constituted a thing of "pleasure or delight." Id. There-
fore, rights to view, unlike rights to light and air, could only arise by express grant or
covenant. Id. at 278.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. Covenants are agreements be-
tween landowners. They may arise out of agreements directly between the parties in
question or through the incorporation of restrictions in deeds. See Comment, supra
note 57, at 116.
73. See supra text and accompanying notes 36-41.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
75. See A. REEVES, supra note 71, § 205, at 278.
76. Id.
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trine of Ancient Lights and the theory of creating easements
by implication only applied in the context of light and air,
negative easements of view continued to be recognized only
when created by express grant or covenant. Consequently, no
action could be brought for the obstruction of a landowner's
view from his premises, unless he could demonstrate that he
had obtained such an easement of view by express grant or
covenant."
III. The Common Law Today
A. Current General Rule
The beginning of the 18th century marked the start of
the decline of the Doctrine of Ancient Lights as a viable the-
ory for establishing easement rights to light and air in this
country. 8 Today, the doctrine has been almost universally re-
jected in the United states. 9 Similarly, most American courts
now deny an easement right to light or air by implication ex-
cept in limited cases of necessity.80
These fundamental changes in American courts' treat-
ment of easement rights in light and air, as opposed to their
English counterparts, have, in effect, placed easement rights
to view on the same level as those of light and air. This is
further reflected by modern American commentators' practice
of lumping easement rights to light, air, and view together and
in American courts' identical treatment of these rights as neg-
77. See Harwood v. Tompkins, 24 N.J.L. 425 (1854); See also Parker v. Foote, 19
Wend. 309 ( N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); A. REEVES, supra note 71, § 205, at 278.
78. See Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
79. Delaware has never fully rejected the doctrine as articulated by the judiciary
of that state in Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873). Louisiana, a civil law
jurisdiction, still allows for prescriptive rights. Comment, supra note 57, at 112.
80. Harte v. Empire State Bldg. Corp., 30 Misc. 2d. 665, 219 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1961)
(where tenant in office building suffered view loss as a result of neighboring land-
owner's installation of a radio antenna, court held removal of antenna not necessary
for full use and enjoyment of plaintiff's premises and that inconvenience alone would
not give rise to easement of view by implication); Blumberg v. Weiss, 129 N.J. Eq. 34,
17 A.2d 823 (1941) (court held that windows in the wall of the complainant's house
overlooking the division line of the empty lot which complainant conveyed away, ne-
cessitated the free passage of light and air and would be entitled to such by virtue of
an implied easement).
[Vol. 6
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ative easements.81 Thus, whereas affirmative easement rights
can still arise by express grant or covenant, implication or
prescription, the current general rule in this country states
that a right to view, like a right to light or air, can only arise
by express grant or covenant82 or, in a minority of states, by
implication.
B. Exceptions to the General Rule
1. Municipality
a. Obstruction of View - Abutting Street
One exception to the general rule that a right to view can
only be created by express grant is the recognition of the right
to view in a landowner whose property abuts a public street.
Early on, American courts acknowledged the existence of cer-
tain private rights accorded to abutting landowners, rights
which existed independently of any public rights in the
street.8a These special rights inuring to the landowner in-
cluded use of the street for ingress and egress to the lot as
well as rights to light and air "from the space occupied by the
street."'" Conferring such rights on an abutting landowner
had the same overall effect as a voluntary grant of such
rights.8 5 As a result, landowners could enforce these rights by
a suit in damages or by an injunction ordering a halt to con-
81. See G. THOMPSON, supra note 66, §§ 235-239, at 398-404; See also 3 R. Pow-
ELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 12, § 414(8).
82. Glover v. Santangelo, 70 Or. App. 689, 690 P.2d 1083 (1984); Gladstone v.
Gregory, 95 Nev. 474, 596 P.2d 491 (1979); Sandstrom v. Larsen, 59 Haw. 491, 583
P.2d 971 (1978); Alloway v. Moyer, 275 Or. 397, 550 P.2d 1379 (1976); King v. Kuglar,
197 Cal. App. 2d 651, 17 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1961) (where a restrictive covenant in a
property owner's deed allowed him to construct a building provided it did not exceed
one story in height, the court upheld the height restriction which was created to pro-
tect view from one elevation to the next); Taliaferro v. Salyer, 162 Cal. App. 2d 685,
328 P.2d 799 (1958); Irving Trust Company v. Anahama Realty Corp., 285 N.Y. 416,
35 N.E.2d 21 (1941). Note that the restrictions in said covenants may not be upheld if
vague or indefinite.
83. 1 J. LEwIs, "ROADS AND STREETS," A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 91(f) at 178-79 (2d. ed. 1900).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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struction on the street impairing the rights.8 6 Gradually, the
same theory began to be applied to view rights both to and
from the premises.87 Today, most jurisdictions recognize an
abutting landowner's private right to view over an abutting
street or highway, but the extent and application of the right
is not uniform in the various states.8 8 In many cases brought
on the basis of state constitutional takings provisions, the
courts have held that in situations where there has been an
obstruction of the view from property abutting on a public
street or highway, such interference amounts to a taking of
property for which compensation must be made, even though
no appropriation of the abutting land itself, nor any easement
therein has been made.8'9 For example, in Liddick v. Council
Bluffs,'0 landowners, whose property abutted a public street,
brought an action to enjoin the city from the contemplated
construction of a viaduct along and over part of the street on
which they fronted. The court held that a substantial impair-
ment of the landowners' view constituted a taking and would
require compensation by the city.' 1 Other cases involving sim-
ilar facts, have qualified these rights of light, air, and view as
inuring to property owners, abutting highways and public
streets, by subordinating them to the public's interest in hav-
86. See Williams v. Los Angeles Ry., 150 Cal. 592, 594, 89 P. 330, 331 (1907);
Story v. New York El. R.R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882). See also Comment, supra note 57, at
115.
87. See Codman v. Evans, 5 Allen 308, 311 (1-); Dill v. School Board, 47 N.J.
Eq. 421, 20 A. 739 (1890).
88. Brett v. City of Rehoboth, No. 249, (Del. Sept. 22, 1986). Annotation, Inter-
ference with View as Matter for Consideration in Eminent Domain, 84 A.L.R.2D 348,
350 (1962). Litigation on the basis of this doctrine shows up in cases involving an
individual vis a vis the state and very rarely in cases involving individuals against
individuals.
89. Annotation, Interference with View as Matter for Consideration in Eminent
Domain, 84 A.L.R.2D 348, 350 (1962). See Flowers v. Morgantown, 272 S.E.2d 663
(W.Va. 1980); Anderlick v. Iowa State Hghwy Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605
(1949); Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942).
90. Liddick, 232 Iowa at 197, 5 N.W.2d at 361.
91. Note that section 18 of Article I of the Iowa Constitution, under which this
action was brought, provided that "[pirivate property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation first being made, or secured to be made to the owner
thereof ...". IowA CONST. art I, § 18.
[Vol. 6
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ing the highway or street improved.9 2 Still other jurisdictions
allow landowners whose property abuts a public street to re-
ceive compensation only when some part of their land has ac-
tually been appropriated. 3 Regardless of these differences,
the concept is significant in that it provides an exception to
the otherwise rigid rules allowing for creation of a right to
view in the limited circumstance of an express grant or cove-
nant, and it tends to suggest that courts have gone too far in
holding that absent such a grant or covenant no right to view
exists.9
b. Physical Taking
Disregarding the abutting street exception, most Ameri-
can courts today refuse to allow compensation for a property
owner's loss of view resulting from government appropriation
of land for the public use, unless such appropriation results in
some actual physical taking of the complainant's land. 5 Court
opinions discussing compensation for this kind of physical
taking are nonetheless significant in that they generally con-
sider the claimant's property view loss as an element of dam-
ages, provided the loss is more than nominal. In addressing
the question of property devaluation as a result of view ob-
struction, such opinions often speak of view as though it was
an actual property right running with land ownership."'
Therefore, like the abutting street exception, many eminent
92. Annotation, Interference with View as Matter for Consideration in Eminent
Domain, 84 A.L.R.2D 348, 350 (1962). This practice of subordination frequently justi-
fies the court's refusal to grant relief to the injured land owner. See Weir v. Palm
Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1956).
93. Probasco v. Reno, 85 Nev. 563, 459 P.2d 772 (1969).
94. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d
357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Fontainebleau involved a suit brought by Eden Roc, a
luxury hotel on Miami Beach, to obtain an injunction which would prevent the neigh-
boring Fontainebleau Hotel from constructing an addition which it was alleged would
shade the Eden Roc's pool and sunbathing areas during the peak winter tourist sea-
son. In denying relief, the court of appeals makes a substantial leap in its reasoning
from its acknowledgement of the rejection of the Doctrine of Ancient lights to its
complete denial of any right to "the free flow of light and air from.., adjoining land"
absent an express grant or covenant to that effect. 114 So. 2d at 359.
95. Annotation, supra note 92, at 360.
96. Id. at 352-55.
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domain case holdings contradict the court's traditional hard
line position restricting recognition of a landowner's right to
view, and limit compensation for a subsequent loss of that
view right to situations where a right to view exists by virtue
of an easement. 7 In Dennison v. State,9 a for example, the
court noted that because appropriation of a portion of the
plaintiff's land for construction of a highway resulted in ob-
struction of the plaintiff's property view and interfered with
his quiet and privacy, the market value of his land fell, and
the plaintiff's loss of property view therefore merited consid-
eration in the court's determination of damages. 9 The ques-
tion which then arises is why courts implicitly recognize view
as a right incident to land ownership when some physical ap-
propriation of the plaintiff's land actually occurs and obstruc-
tion of view subsequently results, but do not generally recog-
nize such rights if the same obstruction of view occurs absent
any physical taking. Some authorities0 ° have noted that this
discrepancy stems from individual state's varied interpreta-
tions 1 ' of the takings clause of the fifth amendment.
In the Supreme Court decision of Pumpelly v. Green Bay
97. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
98. 48 Misc. 2d 778, 265 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1965), aff'd, 28 A.D.2d 28, 281 N.Y.S.2d
257, aff'd, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1968).
99. Id. See also People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 9 Cal Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451
(1960); Crance v. State, 205 Misc. 590, 128 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1954), modified, 284 A.D.
750 (1954); Smith v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 985, 268 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966), aff'd, 29 A.D.2d
1050, 290 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1968).
100. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. 166 (1871). This case dealt with
damages caused by overflow of water on the plaintiff's land as a result of a dam con-
structed under the authorization of the State of Wisconsin and thus involved facts
unrelated to impairment of view. The court found that 1) no person's property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation; 2) that "under the constitutional
provisions it is not necessary that the land should be absolutely taken" in order for
relief to be claimed, but that "a serious interruption to the common and necessary
use of property may be ... equivalent to the taking of it. .. within the meaning of
the Constitution." See id. at 179.
101. The Florida constitution, for example, compensates for appropriation or
taking of property but case law interpreting this language construes "taking" merely
to imply physical taking and construes all other non physical takings as "damnum
absque injuria" and non recoverable. See Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216,
42 So. 394 (1906).
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Company,"2 Justice Miller stated:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in
construing a provision of constitutional law . . . it shall
be held that if the government refrains from the absolute
conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can
destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and per-
manent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to
total destruction without making any compensation, be-
cause, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken
for the public use. 03
Yet some states construe the takings clause of the fifth
amendment in precisely the way that Justice Miller found so
objectionable. Florida, for instance, interprets taking as an ac-
tual taking and compensates landowners accordingly in cases
involving eminent domain proceedings by the state.10 4 Thus,
Justice Miller's comment articulates a reality for landowners
in states which narrowly construe the meaning of a taking. So
long as the government refrains from any physical taking of a
property owner's land, the government need not compensate
the owner, even if the government's act results in a partial or
total destruction of the real property.
This scenario applies frequently with respect to property
views. The typical example is a case in which the government
takes property to build an aqueduct. If the government appro-
priates an actual part of the plaintiff's land, the government
generally compensates the plaintiff for the resulting land loss
as well as for such inherent damages as the obstruction of his
or her property view, provided the obstruction results in a sig-
nificant devaluation of the plaintiff's land. Yet, if the govern-
ment builds the same aqueduct by appropriating the same
amount of land on a neighboring plot not abutting the plain-
tiff's property, courts generally deny recovery to the plaintiff
if the obstruction results in detrimental impairment of the
plaintiff's property view. The irony of this second scenario is
102. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
103. Id. at 177-78.
104. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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that even if the court actually acknowledges that a substantial
decrease in property value has resulted, it can nonetheless
deny recovery on the basis of its definition of a taking. It
would appear, then, that when a physical taking of land oc-
curs and property view loss results, view is treated as a right
which has been affected and therefore merits compensation.
When no land has been taken, however, view no longer consti-
tutes a land right and the loss need not be compensated.
This Comment does not attempt to analyze the vast topic
of the takings clause of the federal constitution. It seeks
merely to alert the reader to the possibility of varieties of in-
terpretations of this clause. A broader reading of the takings
clause at least affords a more favorable argument for compen-
sation for loss of view in those cases which involve eminent
domain proceedings and which do not actually result in physi-
cal entry onto the plaintiff's land. This broader reading may
even suggest a "right" to view, running with land ownership,
when government's physically interfere with property owner's
land in such eminent domain proceedings.
2. Spite Fence Exception
While courts have recognized a right to view vis a vis a
municipality, absent an express easement to that effect, there
does not appear to be the same flexibility with respect to this
general rule vis a vis another individual. In fact, spite fence
rulings afford the only instance, in the context of an individ-
ual versus another individual, in which courts have deviated
from their strict construction of the rule denying a right to
view absent a negative easement.
A spite fence can be defined as any structure which serves
no useful purpose or which serves a purpose deemed
"subordinate and incidental" to the detriment suffered by the
complaining landowner as a result of such structure. 18 Prior
to 1888, American courts refused to declare the maintenance
of a spite fence an actionable wrong. 06 Thus, even a fence
105. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 12, § 696.
106. Id. at 35 n.4; Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888).
[Vol. 6
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built "without any benefit or pleasure to [the person erecting
it], but solely with the malicious motive of injuring the [ad-
joining owner] by shutting out his light, air, and view," '107 af-
forded the injured landowner no cause of action. 108 After the
decision of Burke v. Smith,' 09 spite fences were condemned in
the courts." 0 Today, many American states have created spite
fence statutes,"' and those which have not generally allow for
an action to curtail spite fences in the courts. 2 The spite
fence exception proves significant because it affords a land-
owner, having no special easement to view, a superior right vis
a vis another individual who wishes to maintain a fence which
serves no useful purpose and which obstructs the complaining
landowner's view. It is also significant in that it affords the
landowner an action in nuisance"' against the individual who
constructed the "spite fence," and thereby lends support to
the possibility of a more general action in nuisance for land-
owners suffering losses of view." 4
IV. Land Use Statutes
Exceptions notwithstanding, the general unwillingness of
the judiciary to protect property owners' views, absent ease-
ment rights, have forced legislative and administrative bodies
107. Racich v. Mastrovich, 273 N.W. 660, 663 n.10 (S.D. 1937).
108. Comment, Spite Fences and Spite Wells: Relevancy of Motive in the Rela-
tions of Adjoining Landowners, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 692 (1938).
109. 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W 838 (1888).
110. Comment, supra, note 108, at 693. See also R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra
note 12, § 696.
ill. Some of these include: CAL. CIv. CODE § 841.4; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
480, § 52-570; NY REAL PROP. ACTS. 843. See also R. POWELL & P. ROAN, supra note
12, § 696.
112. Bar Due v. Cox, 190 P. 1056, 47 Cal. App. 713 (1920) (plaintiff brought ac-
tion to abate defendant's fence, which shut off plaintiff's view from the house and
obstructed the light and air thereof, to have it declared a private nuisance, and to
have it removed or to have it reduced in height to not in excess of 10 ft.); Hornsby v.
Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941). (plaintiff successfully brought suit against
defendant for damages for the maintenance of a fence which effectively obstructed
plaintiff's view and which obstructed the free passage of light and air over her
property).
113. See G. THOMPSON, supra note 66, § 239 at 261.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 148-157.
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to take a stronger hand in this area. Through the use of zon-
ing laws and ordinances, municipalities throughout the vari-
ous states can and do protect this right."'
Local ordinances and zoning laws have been utilized more
and more frequently in the context of preservation of land-
owner's property view interests,116 and have met with little
opposition from the judiciary when clearly and unambiguously
set forth.1 7 The recognition of ordinances of this nature as a
valid exercise of the state's police power follows closely on the
heels of similar rulings legitimizing ordinances protecting light
and air 1 8 and aesthetic values.1 9
Height restrictions represent one of the means employed
by state legislatures to protect views. Such height restrictions
may come in the form of zoning laws or nonzoning ordi-
nances,120 and may serve to regulate the heights of anything
ranging from buildings and fences to shrubs and trees.'21 Set-
115. Pacifica Homeowners' Assoc. v. Wesley Palms Retirement Community, 178
Cal. App. 3d 1147, 1152, 224 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (1986).
116. See Ross v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, 192 Cal. App. 3d 370, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 561 (1987); Landmark Company, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d
1281, 1286-87 (1986).
117. Ross, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 563, (1987); See also Mc-
Murtry v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 766-67, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 910, 914-15 (1960) (wherein the court said, "[a] statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essen-
tial of due process of law.") Id. at 766-67, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
118. Taliaferro v. Salyer, 162 Cal. App. 2d 685, 691, 328 P.2d 799, 802.
119. People v. Berlin, 62 Misc. 2d 272 (1970); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-
33 (1954) (wherein the court held that "[it] is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy .. ") See also
up Polygon Corp v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978) (court
upheld city's denial of building permit due primarily to visual environmental con-
cerns); Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1, 543 P.2d 715 (1975) (court
upheld ordinance requiring fencing around garbage containers of multi-resident
dwellings).
120. A zoning law is a legislative regulation applying to specified districts of a
city. Black's Law Dictionary 1450-51 (5th ed. 1979). An Ordinance is a municipal
statute "governing matters not already covered by federal or state law." Id. at 989.
Ordinances can govern such areas as zoning, building and safety. Id. Thus, a nonzon-
ing ordinance represents a municipal statute not restricted to a particular section of
the city.
121. Landmark Company, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d at 1286-
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back and bulk requirements, as well as limitations on con-
struction in a given area, represent other common forms of
zoning regulations which can also be used as a mechanism for
preserving view interests. 22
There are two significant problems with relying on zoning
laws and ordinances to protect property views. First, both are
subject to modification, " and second, even if an adjoining
landowner constructs a structure in violation of a building
regulation which obstructs an individual's light, air, or view,
the individual may not be allowed to recover damages for the
interference absent an easement for light, air, or view over the
adjoining land;124 the theory being that one cannot recover
damages for that to which they have no right.1 2 5 View ordi-
nances or ordinances specifically created to preserve landown-
ers' property views, although not widely developed in the
United States, have enjoyed growing popularity, especially in
the western states where views are often seen as valuable land
resources.12 6 Ordinances of this sort seem to provide more suf-
ficient protection to those concerned with preserving view
rights than the more traditional kinds of ordinances and zon-
ing laws. This is partially due to the fact that such ordinances
tend to include provisions specifically limiting heights of given
structures,1 27 and said provisions are strictly enforced by the
122. See Lee v. City of Monterey Park, 173 Cal. App. 3d 798 (1985).
123. Reichekderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932). "Zoning regulations are not
contracts by the government and may be modified .. " Id. at 323.
124. Taliaferro v. Salyer, 162 Cal. App. 2d 685, 328 P.2d 799 (1958).
125. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d. 357,
359 (1959).
126. The.Monterey Board of Supervisors is currently reviewing an ordinance
proposal submitted by Zadd Levy on behalf of the Big Sur Coastal Program. The
proposed ordinance would ban construction that would block views along a 60-mile
stretch of California's Highway 1, from Carmel to San Luis Obispo. The proponents
of the ordinance contend that non approval of such an ordinance may result in the
loss of valuable resources including views. See Adams, Land-use Ruling may be
Threat to Tough Zoning Regulations, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chron.,
June 14, 1987, at B-8, col. 1.
127. Landmark Company, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1280
(1986) (the court upheld the city's denial of appellant's request for a building permit
to construct a twenty-one story office building when the denial was based on an
amendment to the city's mountain view ordinance which allowed for building height
restrictions notwithstanding a landowners compliance with existing local zoning laws
11988]
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cities involved. A more compelling reason, however, is the fact
that most cities creating such ordinances subject the land-
owner, who has obstructed or poses a threat of obstructing the
protected view, to some sort of review by a city review
board.12 The review not only provides a check system for the
city with respect to landowners acting in contravention of the
purposes of the ordinance but it also creates a right of action
in the individual injured (or potentially injured) by such a
landowner.129 The nature of the cause of action thereby cre-
ated in the landowner is the right to bring his complaint to
the attention of the board. If the board finds that such action
on the part of the offending landowner violates the view ordi-
nance in question, either the board, or the complaining land-
owner, or both will be able to bring action in the courts, de-
pending on how the ordinance is written.
V. Nuisance Law
A. Policy Considerations
Landowners have shown a desire to preserve land values
by ensuring the protection of property views. They have man-
ifested this desire by flooding courts of all jurisdictions with a
myriad of law suits each year on this very subject.'30 Govern-
ments have recognized the value landowners place on prop-
erty by giving careful consideration to view obstruction when
in existence at the time).
128. In Ross v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, 192 Cal. App. 3d 370, 238 Cal. Rptr.
561 (1987). Conformance with the objectives of a view protection ordinance requiring
design reviews by the city served as the justification for the city council's refusal to
grant the appellants a building permit to expand their home, even though the plans
complied with local zoning codes.
129. See Ross, at 374-75, 238 Cal. Rptr. 562-63, n.2 at _. In Ross, the view
ordinance provided for review of "new developments within the various view sheds
contained in the City .... Id. at n.2. It also provided for a view preservation site
inspection "[sihould it appear that a potential view impairment [might] result from a
proposed development, addition or alteration. ... Id. The ordinance further pro-
vided for a public meeting to review any complaints by aggrieved persons or any com-
plaints reported by a city official with respect to pending development..Id.
130. One of the more recent cases in this area is Ross v. City of Rolling Hills
Estates, 192 Cal. App. 3d 370, 238 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1987).
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compensating individuals in eminent domain proceedings.1 3 1
They have further shown it by taking zoning laws and ordi-
nances beyond the realm of health and welfare and into the
realm of aesthetics and view preservation. 132 They have cre-
ated zoning laws and ordinances limiting building heights,
tree growth, and general construction for the express purpose
of protecting views and, more recently, by creating actual view
ordinances. 3 ' Nonetheless, courts, with limited exception, re-
main steadfast in their insistence upon easement rights to
view before allowing any judicial protection. The reluctance of
American courts to protect property views parallels their re-
luctance to protect access to light and air and both stem from
the courts' discomfort with impeding land development. 34
The primacy of development has, in recent years, been called
into question, thus opening the door to other kinds of actions
for the recognition and protection of rights to light, air, and
view.
B. Support for a Private Action in Nuisance for Obstruc-
tion of Light: A Model
In the 1970's, with the advent of solar energy conscious-
ness, protection of a landowner's access to light took on a new
significance'3 5 and social values favoring absolute superiority
of private development experienced a retraction. 136 Through-
out the 1970's and 1980's, commentators advocated the estab-
lishment of an action in nuisance for the obstruction of sun-
light.'37 The Wisconsin Supreme Court lent support to this
idea in its 1982 decision of Prah v. Marretti.138 In Prah, the
owner of a solar-heated home brought an action to enjoin a
131. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 155-157.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 126-128.
134. Prah v. Marretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 235, 321 N.W.2d 182, 189. (1982).
135. See Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 94, 106 (1977).
136. See Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
137. See Comment supra, note 57, at 109. See also Comment, supra, note 135, at
94.
138. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
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neighboring landowner from constructing a residence which
would impede the plaintiff's access to unobstructed sunlight
over the defendant's property. The lower court held that the
plaintiff stated no claim upon which relief could be granted
since the defendant's proposed construction met with all the
deed restrictions and local ordinances then in existence and
since the plaintiff had not obtained any easement right to
sunlight. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed saying
that the plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could
be granted and justified the reversal by saying that the "de-
fendant's obstruction of the plaintiff's access to sunlight ap-
pears to fall within the Restatement's broad concept of pri-
vate nuisance . ".1.."I39 The opinion of the Prah court is
significant in that it rejects the otherwise traditional view ar-
ticulated in Fontainebleau Hotel Corp v. Forty-Five Twenty-
Five, Inc." that the law does not recognize a right of access
to light and that the law therefore excludes such a right "per
se from private nuisance .... analysis. 42 The Prah court
139. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 232, 321 N.W.2d at 187. A private nuisance is any
interference with the use and enjoyment of land. "The ownership or rightful posses-
sion of land necessarily involves the right not only to the unimpaired condition of the
property itself, but also to some reasonable comfort and convenience in its occupation
....." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §
87 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON].
A private nuisance exists where one is "injured in relation to a right which he
enjoys by reason of his ownership of an interest in land." 58 Am. Jur. 2d Private
Nuisance § 9 (1971). It is an individual wrong "arising from an unreasonable, unwar-
rantable, or unlawful use of one's property producing such material annoyance, incon-
venience, and discomfort, or hurt that the law will presume a consequent damage."
Id. at § 9.
The main argument against a private action in nuisance for obstruction of view,
like that against a private nuisance action for obstruction of light, is that absent an
easement to light or view, no recognized right has been interfered with and no action
can therefore be maintained. See Katcher v. Home Sav. & L Ass'n., 245 Cal. App. 2d
425, 53 Cal. Rptr. 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). The court denied plaintiff relief absent
any right to light, air, and view created by easement even though plaintiff showed
that his enjoyment of a "panoramic view" and "extraordinary light and air" was im-
peded when defendant constructed terraced homes in violation of the zoning plan
then in existence. Id. at 427, 53 Cal. Rptr. 923.
140. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla.
1960).
141. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 238 n.13, 321 N.W.2d at 190 n.12.
142. Comment, Solar Rights and Private Nuisance Law, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss1/7
SECURING A RIGHT TO VIEW
arrives at this decision by a careful evaluation of the policies
supporting the view that no right of access to light exists. It
finds that those policies, which include the belief that land-
owners should be able to use their land as they wish and the
concern with promoting land development, 43 "reflect factual
circumstances and social priorities that are now obsolete."""'
More significant than the Prah court's rejection of Fon-
tainebleau or its reasoning for such a rejection, however, is
the breadth of that rejection. The Prah court did not limit its
refusal to adhere to the traditional rules governing rights to
light by distinguishing its concern with access to sunlight as
an energy source from the Fontainebleau court's concern with
access to sunlight as a source of illumination and aesthetic
beauty. 4 " Rather, it spoke of a private nuisance action for ac-
cess to light in general terms and thereby implied that it
would use private nuisance law to balance competing interests
of landowners in all access to sunlight situations, whether the
dispute involves the shading of the complainant's swimming
pool or his solar collector.""
In further support of this proposition, the Prah court
points out that sunlight has already been "protected in this
country by the common-law private nuisance law, at least in
the narrow context of the modern American rule invalidating
spite fences," and suggests that its decision constitutes a mere
extension of this law.147
C. A Private Action in Nuisance for Obstruction of View
The same reasoning espoused by the Prah court 148 in the
435, 440 (1983).
143. Note, Prah v. Maretti: Property Law - Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private
Nuisance, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1983).
144. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
145. See Note, supra note 136, at 443.
146. Id.
147. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
148. See At least one other court has indicated that the law of private nuisance
should apply to actions for obstructions of light. Tenn v. 889 Associates, Ltd., 127
N.H. 321, 500 A.2d 366 (1985) The plaintiff brought action in private nuisance to
enjoin the planned construction of a building which would obstruct the flow of light
and air to plaintiff's office building. The court denied relief based on its assertion that
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context of a private action in nuisance for the obstruction of
sunlight can be applied with respect to a similar action for
obstruction of view. Such an action in private nuisance would
allow the court to balance the utility of the conduct allegedly
affecting view interests against the actual harm caused by
such conduct. In considering the possibility of a private nui-
sance action for the obstruction of view, the question which
must be addressed is how property view interests fare as con-
trasted with interests in light and air in this balancing. To
answer this question, it is helpful to review the courts' reasons
for upholding nuisance actions in the areas of light and air.
One should recall that in neither the Prah case, which sup-
ported an action in private nuisance for light, nor in Tenn v.
889 Associates, Ltd.,'49 which supported such a nuisance ac-
tion for the obstruction of light and air, did the court require,
in any way, that the respective use of the light or air be a
necessity in order to invoke a claim under the law of private
nuisance. In this way, the law of private nuisance does not
parallel the English common-law right to prescription, which
only applied in cases of light and air when light and air were
necessary, and did not apply in cases of view, which were con-
sidered a matter of delight.' 50 Rather, the Prah and Tenn
courts stressed the adaptability of the law of nuisance to
changing times, and stated that such a doctrine serves to pro-
tect land enjoyment. The court in Tenn stated: "[w]e have de-
veloped a law of nuisance that protects the use and enjoyment
of property when a threatened harm to the plaintiff owner can
the interference would not be an unreasonable interference but it nontheless articu-
lated much of the same reasoning applied by the Prah court with respect to an action
in private nuisance for obstruction of light and air. The court stated:
Viewing the elements and concept of private nuisance ... there is no reason
in principle why the law of nuisance should not be applied to claims for the
protection of a property owner's interests in light and air, and ... we believe
that considerations of policy support just such an application of nuisance
concepts. We therefore hold that the law of private nuisance... provides the
appropriate standard for passing on a property owner's claims of interference
with interests in light and air.
Id. at 327, 500 A.2d 370.
149. 127 N.H. 321, 500 A.2d 366 (1985).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
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be said to outweigh the utility of the defendant owner's con-
duct to himself and to the community."' 1
Similarly, in cases involving private nuisance actions for
foul odors1 52 and excessive light,153 the respective courts re-
quired only that the thing claimed as a nuisance substantially
"interfere with . . . the reasonable and necessary enjoyment of
[plaintiff's] property .... " 154 Courts recognizing a private ac-
tion for aesthetic nuisance also look at how the offending use
impacts on the complainant's use and enjoyment of his or her
land."'55 In Foley v. Harris,5 ' for instance, the court said:
[t]he phrase 'use and enjoyment of land' is broad. It com-
prehends the pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment that a
person normally derives from the occupancy of land.
Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using
land, which inevitably involves an element of personal
tastes and sensibilities, is often as important to a person
as freedom from physical interruption with use of the
land itself. The discomfort and annoyance must, however,
be significant and of a kind that would be suffered by a
normal person in the community.'57
In light of these examples, and in light of the fact that
the law of private nuisance balancing has already been
adopted by American courts in the context of view obstruc-
tion in the "spite fence cases,"' 58 it would appear that a gen-
eral action in private nuisance for obstruction of view would
151. Tenn, 127 N.H. at 327, 500 A.2d at 370.
152. Higgens v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932).
153. Hansen v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959
(1939).
154. Id. at 112, 98 P.2d at 962.
155. See Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Ju-
dicial Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 151 (1987). In defining "use and enjoyment," see
Foley v. Harris, 223 Va. 20, 28, 286 S.E.2d 186, 190-91 (1982).
156. 223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186 (1982). The Supreme Court of Virginia allowed
plaintiff to enjoin the defendant from maintaining wrecked automobiles on defend-
ant's lot since they obstructed the plaintiff's "reasonable and comfortable use of (his)
property .... Id. at 29, 286 S.E.2d at 191.
157. Id. at 28, 286 S.E.2d at 190-91.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 105-114.
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prove a logical extension of the doctrine.
VI. Recent Developments Impacting on Rights to View
A. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n
In the wake of the recent Supreme Court decision of Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Comm'n 9 and other recent develop-
ments in land use law, the need for implementing legislation
to protect landowners' property view interests becomes more
and more apparent. Many experts feel that these develop-
ments will greatly affect the ability of local governments to
regulate land use. 1' 0 Some cite Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n'6 ' as impacting particularly on planning. The Nollan
case involved a beachfront homeowner who successfully chal-
lenged the Coastal Commission requirement that he grant the
public an easement over a portion of his private beach as a
condition of obtaining a permit to rebuild his Ventura home.
One commentator articulated his belief that the ruling would
inhibit any local government which "requires conditions to
balance public rights and the rights of property owners. '162
Other commentators see the case as having a narrower effect
on local governments." 3 The question which necessarily arises
is whether such a ruling, further enforcing governments' re-
quirements to compensate landowners for takings made for
the public good, will have an impact on local zoning and ordi-
nance laws concerning view preservation. The key to answer-
ing this question is the determination of whether such regula-
tions further the government purpose in enacting the
regulation."6 4
In Nollan, the Coastal Commission agreed to grant to the
plaintiffs the necessary building permit to build a three bed-
room house subject to the condition that the plaintiffs grant
an easement which would allow the public to pass over a part
159. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
160. San Francisco Chron., June 27, 1987, at 9, col. 1.
161. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
162. Supra note 160, at col. 2.
163. Id.
164. See Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3148.
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of their property. 65 The plaintiffs argued that such a condi-
tion could only be imposed if the proposed development
would cause a direct and "adverse impact on public access to
the beach."" 6 The court agreed with the plaintiffs and re-
quired that the Coastal Commission demonstrate a nexus be-
tween the nature of the exaction and a legitimate end which
would justify the total prohibition of the proposed use 67 or, in
other words, that they show that the condition substantially
furthered the purposes of the original permit requirement.'68
The Commission alleged that the plaintiff's proposed con-
struction would interfere with "visual access" to the beach
and thus, with the desire of people driving past the Nollan's
house to use the beach.'19 This ensuing "psychological bar-
rier" to access would, they argued, necessitate a need for more
public access, thereby justifying the easement condition.17 1
The court dismissed the city's argument saying that they, the
court, did not understand how "a requirement that people al-
ready on the beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' prop-
erty [would reduce] any obstacles to viewing the beach cre-
ated by the new home.''7 The court added that it failed to
see how such an easement would lower any "psychological
barriers" against using the beach or remedy any extra "con-
gestion" on the beach resulting from the Nollans' new
house. 72
It does not appear that the Nollan decision will have a
tremendous impact on ordinance and zoning laws created for
the purpose of protecting property views. The ruling does not
ban local governments from creating zoning laws and ordi-
nances which result in restrictions on land use. On the con-
trary, the court in Nollan upholds governments' rights to re-
165. Id. at 3143.
166. Id.
167. Best, New Constitutional Standards for Land Use Regulation. Portents of
Nollan and First English Church, PAc. LEGAL FoUND. 13 (July 22, 1987).
168. The purpose of the permit requirement being to promote public access to
the coastline. Nollan, 107 S. Ct at 3146.
169. Id. at 3149.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
1988]
27
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
strict land use through the enactment of ordinances and
zoning laws provided the purposes they serve constitute legiti-
mate functions of the police power and that the restrictions
further these legitimate purposes.173 Even in the context of
open space zoning, which offers one means of achieving view
obstruction protection 174 and where the Nollan decision is an-
ticipated to impact more strongly, view preservation motives
should be upheld provided they are properly articulated as
among the legitimate purposes for the open space law. Finally,
Nollan does not alter the definition of a taking as an action
removing the possibility of any economically viable use of the
property in question. It therefore tends to suggest that the
impact of Nollan on local government regulations limiting
land use for the purpose of preserving view interests may in
fact have no greater effect than to promote a rush of law suits
on the matter. 17 Regardless of the actual effect of Nollan on
zoning laws and ordinances governing view protection, the
court's opinion does lend support for increased legislative ac-
tion in the form of public nuisance law in two ways. First, spe-
cific laws setting out a landowner's rights to action in cases
involving view obstruction will tend to cut down on the antici-
pated rush of law suits in the land use field which specifically
relate to property view disputes, thereby saving time and ex-
pense. Secondly, such legislation would reinforce, in the minds
of the judiciary, local governments' already declared right to
restrict land use through the enactment of ordinances and
zoning laws. Theoretically, this should include a local govern-
ment's right to enact statutes restricting land use for the pur-
pose of preserving valuable property view interests, provided
that the good achieved by preventing such view impairment
proves disproportionately superior to the harm caused by re-
stricting maximum land development potential.
173. Id. at 3146.
174. See Ross v. Rolling Hills Estates, 192 Cal. App. 3d 370, 238 Cal. Rptr. 561
(1987) (court upheld a city ordinance, allowing the city of Rolling Hills Estates to
review new construction to protect existing property views in order to enhance open
space preservation).
175. Robinson, Property rights ruling won't have much Impact, local planners
say, Sebastopol Times, June 18, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
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B. Transferrable Development Rights
Like Nolian, the advent of transferrable development
rights (TDRs) increases the necessity of implementing legisla-
tion with respect to view preservation. In New York, for in-
stance, where building heights are restricted by floor area ra-
tios, owners of property not making full use of their air rights
have begun to market them. This transferring of air rights, as
it is termed, is particularly attractive where there is "substan-
tial demand for office or residential space . 176 In New
York City today, an owner of a land site who has not achieved
his full height potential, may transfer his air rights to an adja-
cent lot owner across the street. 17 7 Zoning laws currently in
effect then allow the transferee to lump his rights in the con-
tiguous lot with his own rights to form one larger zoning lot
for purposes of floor area ratio computation.1 7 8 "A land
[owner's] unbuilt development potential could thus be
deployed on a contiguous site within the same zoning lot.
179
The potential effect of such transferral of zoning rights is that
a lot owner maintaining a building which complies with all
zoning laws in existence, may suddenly find that an adjacent
landowner, having acquired transferrable development rights,
has thereby obtained a larger zoning lot, allowing him to con-
struct a building so large that it completely obstructs the for-
mer's light, air, and view. The inequity of all this is that the
former landowner may have obtained his land at a time when
TDR's were never foreseen and thus neither he nor the mu-
nicipality itself ever foresaw that such a contravention of zon-
ing height restrictions could be achieved.
VII. A Solution: Public Nuisance Legislation
In light of the growing societal recognition of the value of
view and the common law's inability to secure the right to
176. Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
372, 373 (1971).
177. Id. at 374. "All lots must be in the same ownership." Id. at 375.
178. See, Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 267, 332 N.Y.S.2d
617, 620, 283 N.E.2d 600, 602 (1972).
179. MARCUS, supra note 176, at 373.
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view, state legislatures should consider enacting a statutory
public nuisance action for the unreasonable obstruction of
view. Laws naming certain actions or situations as public nui-
sances exist in most states. Such statutes define that which
constitutes an "unreasonable interference with a right com-
mon to the public" and operate such that a nuisance which
interferes with an individual's exercise of a public right is ac-
tionable.' 0 The creation of a public nuisance action for inter-
ference with view could afford landowners threatened by view
obstructions a chance to have unreasonable interferences
abated. A variation on this idea would be to qualify municipal
zoning laws and ordinances, which restrict certain activity for
the purpose of protecting view, by designating violations of
such restrictions public nuisances. In California, a state stat-
ute authorizes municipal legislative bodies to prescribe that
which constitutes nuisance.181 An example of this kind of nui-
sance designation is found in Nathan v. Town of Tiburon,"s2
wherein the plaintiff brought an action declaring a town ordi-
nance, which restricted the height of trees so as not to unrea-
sonably obstruct view and sunlight, and which designated a
violation of this restriction an actionable public nuisance, un-
constitutional. The Superior Court of California, County of
Matin, found the ordinance constitutional and declared it a
"valid enactment under § 38771 of the government code per-
mitting the council to declare what is a nuisance. ' 183
A second variation would be a public nuisance statute for
the obstruction of view which would also allow for a private
right of action to sue under the statute. 184 This would prove
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). See
also Comment, supra note 57, at 128.
181. Burton v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial Dist. of Los Angeles
County, 68 Cal. 2d 684, 441 P.2d 281, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1968). Note that the power
designated under Government Code 38771 is not limited to those things within the
meaning of Penal Code § 370 and Civil Code § 3479 and § 3480. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 38771 (West 1988). See also People v. Johnson, 129 Cal. App. 2d 1, 277 P.2d 45
(1954).
182. Nathan v. Tiburon, no. 125428 of Tentative Statement of Decision. (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1987).
183. Id. at 1.
184. See Comment, supra note 57, at 129 n.140.
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the most satisfactory as it would avoid two of the major set-
backs that often accompany public nuisance actions; first, the
problem of relying on a public official to bring the nuisance
action, and second, the restriction allowing private individuals
to bring such an action only if the injury which the individual
alleges to have suffered differs in kind from that which the
public has suffered. 18 5 This second particularity of the public
nuisance action is especially problematic because it requires
courts to split hairs over the question of whether the injury
resulting from the alleged public nuisance is more general or
equally distributed, or whether it is more particular to a cer-
tain group of individuals.18 Although the view obstruction
suffered by one landowner as a result of construction or tree
growth may, in many instances, be different from that suf-
fered by the public, it may also be very similar. It might,
therefore, prove advantageous for legislators to incorporate a
provision allowing an individual the right to initiate suit in
any statute granting a public nuisance action for obstruction
of view. 1  Florida, for instance, has already incorporated such
a provision in a state public nuisance statute.188
VIII. Conclusion
The recognition of rights to view vis a vis a municipality,
even in the limited circumstances that such rights now exist,
indicates, at the very least, the American courts recognition of
a societal value. This author would venture to suggest that the
same values or rights which American courts appear to uphold
vis a vis a municipality, should be expanded and broadened to
better protect the individual. The enactment of legislation
supporting a private nuisance action for the unreasonable ob-
struction of landowners' property views, coupled with more ef-
185. Id. at 129-30.
186. See Kaje v. Chicago, St P., M & 0 Ry Co., 57 Minn. 422, 424, 59 N.W. 493,
493 (1894).
187. See Comment, supra at 57 at 130 (where the author makes a parallel argu-
ment for statutes dealing with obstruction of light).
188. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05(1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1989).
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fective local zoning and ordinance laws, would prove the most
effective means of accomplishing such an objective.
Tara J. Foster
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